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Abuse of Attorneys by Judges
Francis G. Homan, Jr.*
P OPULAR NOTIONS HAVE IT that almost all misconduct in the
courtroom is attributable to attorneys. Yet many practi-
tioners before the bar have suffered abuse by members of the
judiciary. How frequently this occurs is not known, but some-
times incidents of non-judicial conduct are revealed in other than
case reports. Recently the House Judiciary Committee was hold-
ing hearings on an appointee to the federal bench. One witness
testified that the judge under consideration had a violent
temper, apt to flare up at the slightest provocation. The judge
had denounced her as "just a crummy little lawyer from the
crummy little Legal Aid Society." Other lawyer witnesses testi-
fied to being "cooperized"--i.e., excoriated and publicly humil-
iated for smiling or rustling papers. New York City's Associa-
tion of the Bar opposed him, but the account doesn't mention if
he was appointed.'
Most biographical accounts of attorneys contain at least one
anecdote about mistreatment by a judge. For example, a famous
West Coast attorney when just entering practice was asked by
another lawyer to go to court and ask for a continuance. The
judge had a reputation for intolerance and a cantankerous dis-
position. When the young attorney made his request, the judge
snapped, "I'm amazed at Mr. Christiansen's imprudence in send-
ing a mere beardless youth." The onlookers in the courtroom
snickered and the young attorney angrily retorted, "Your Honor,
if Mr. Christiansen had known you attached so much importance
to whiskers, I'm sure he would have sent a billy goat." The
judge promptly denied the continuance and fined the attorney
$20.00 for contempt.2
A well-known Supreme Court Justice of a large eastern
state narrates a classic case of judicial abuse. When he was a
young lawyer trying a trespass case, it became evident before
long that the judge was biased in favor of the opposing side.
The judge began to badger the attorney by interrupting con-
* B.A., M.A., University of Pennsylvania; Fourth-year student at Cleve-
land-Marshall Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Day in Court; Controversial Figure, Time, Mar. 30, 1962, p. 16.
2 Noble & Averbuch, Never Plead Guilty, 23 (1955).
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tinuously, insinuating he had a very weak case and that the
attorney was immature in his handling of the case. At the con-
clusion of the trial the judge turned to the jury and ordered
them to bring a verdict for the defendants. (The attorney had
the plaintiffs.) However, the jury ignored instructions and re-
turned a verdict for the plaintiffs. The judge exploded with an
angry, "What do you mean with such an outlandish verdict?"
The foreman replied that the jurors thought the plaintiffs were
entitled to everything they asked for. The judge ignored the
finding of the jury and ordered the clerk to change the verdict
so that it read, "For the defendants." The changed verdict was
reversed on appeal.3
Ironically, the same attorney, when he was serving on the
bench of the Court of Common Pleas many years later, was
himself guilty of abusing an attorney. He asked counsel in a
trespass suit if he had ever been a member of the Communist
Party or whether he had ever advocated the overthrow of the
government of the United States by force and violence. Coun-
sel objected that the court was without jurisdiction to ask those
questions and made a motion for a mistrial. The judge ignored
the motion and when counsel attempted to leave the courtroom
he was restrained by court officers upon order of the judge.
Counsel was then castigated as being morally unfit to appear in
the United States Court because he allegedly did not bear al-
legiance to the United States. Counsel objected to this treat-
ment and was found in contempt and then barred from the prac-
tice of law in that county.4 Counsel then petitioned for a writ
of prohibition from the state Supreme Court. That court issued
a writ vacating the orders of the judge and restraining him from
enforcing his order forbidding the petitioner to practice law or
from any further action in contempt proceedings. The appeals
judges stated their own opposition to Communism but opined
that the judge in his zealousness had adopted the very methods
of that system by acting in an arbitrary and unjudicial way.5
Abuse as Grounds for Reversal
The all-time record for judicial abuse would seem to go to
a judge of the California Superior Court, Judge Charles S.
Burnell, who "served" the people of Los Angeles County for at
3 Musmanno, Verdict, 57 (1958).





least twenty years. His conduct on the bench was the subject of
acidulous comment by the Appeals Court in at least eight ap-
peals decisions where he was reversed." Here is what the ap-
pellate court said about Judge Burnell:
"In the ordinary case we would be constrained to reprimand
Judge Burnell for his flagrant disregard of the canons of
judicial ethics and for his non-judicial and outrageous con-
duct. However, we refrain from doing so for the reason that
the reported cases show that from time to time the appellate
courts have directed Judge Burnell's attention to the im-
propriety of conduct similar to that which occurred in the
present case-all to no avail." 7
The attorney had made a proper objection to certain testi-
mony being entered and the judge had remarked "if you don't
want the jury to know the truth, I will sustain your objection."
The appeals court noted, after castigating the judge, that this
would indicate to the jury that evidence was being suppressed
and create prejudice against the appellant's case."
In all fairness, it must be said that the trial judge was im-
partial as the other cases show that he abused plaintiff and de-
fense attorneys, as well as the parties to the suits, equally.
An indication that a judge is favoring one side or the other
could well bias the jury. In Illinois, a remark by the judge to
plaintiff's counsel that it wasn't permissible to manufacture any-
thing in the case promptly had the attorney excepting on the
ground of prejudicing the jury against his client's cause. The
appeals court held this was reversible error in that the trial
judge failed to exhibit the fair and impartial demeanor expected
of him.- An Iowa judge was reversed for advising an attorney,
"You better try this lawsuit like a lawyer would try it." 10 An
Illinois reviewing tribunal found it reversible error for the trial
judge to constantly interrupt counsel during examination of the
defendant with disparaging remarks relative to the ability of
6 People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 258 P. 607 (1927); People v. Earle, 10 Cal.
App. 2d 163, 51 P. 2d 147 (1935); People v. Johnson, 11 Cal. App. 2d 22, 52
P. 2d 964 (1935); People v. McNeer, 8 Cal. App. 2d 676, 47 P. 2d 813 (1935);
People v. Williams, 55 Cal. App. 2d 696, 131 P. 2d 85 (1942); Podalsky v.
Price, 87 Cal. App. 2d 151, 196 P. 2d 608 (1948); Murr v. Murr, 197 P. 2d
369, 87 Cal. App. 2d 511 (1948).
7 Etzel v. Rosenbloom, 83 Cal. App. 2d 758, 189 P. 2d 848 (1951).
8 Ibid.
9 Foster v. Shepard, 258 Ill. 164, 110 N. E. 411 (1913).
10 Pickerell v. Griffith, 238 Iowa 1151, 29 N. W. 2d 588 (1947).
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counsel, charging him with ignorance of the rules of evidence,
asking what law book he studied on evidence, telling counsel he,
the judge, was not running a law school and belittling the defense
in general."
In another Illinois case defense attorneys challenged the
jury array and made a motion to quash the entire venire. In-
stead of passing on the motion the judge severely criticized and
denounced counsel, accusing them of improper and unethical
practices, poor sportsmanship and stating "their word wasn't any
good." The remarks were not made in front of the jury, but
were printed in the newspapers. The jury going out into the
community could hear and read them. On appeal it was held that
the remarks were calculated to prejudice the jury against the
defendants and deprive them of a fair trial.12
A judge was reversed when during the course of the trial
he characterized a courteous request by defense counsel as an
unethical tactic: "Wait a minute. We will try this lawsuit the
way it should be tried and there will be no more of this shyster
stuff." The appeals court deplored the coupling of the word
"shyster" with "stuff." The comments were so inflammatory and
prejudicial to the rights of the accused as to require a mistrial."3
A Tennessee judge became unreasonably angry at the de-
fense attorney because of a minor error in pleading. He charged
her with legal ignorance, said she wasn't playing with dolls, and
described her conduct as intolerable. The defendant's conviction
was reversed, the appeals court feeling that the judge's intem-
perance was disproportionate to the offense. 14
A New York appellate division held that the plaintiff had
been deprived of a "fair and impartial trial" when the trial
judge repeatedly interrupted plaintiff's counsel during exami-
nation of his witnesses and undertook to gratuitously aid the de-
fense by his interrogation and comments. 15
A Pennsylvania case was reversed on the definition given to
a word used by the trial court. He used the word "harangue"
several times in describing defense counsel's jury summation.
11 People v. Wilson, 343 Ill. 412, 166 N. E. 40 (1945).
12 Day v. Thomson, 305 Ill. App. 29, 26 N. E. 2d 429 (1940).
1s Moore v. State, 147 Neb. 390, 23 N. W. 2d 552 (1946).
14 Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 67, 213 S. W. 2d 7 (1948).





The reviewing court found that Webster's defined "harangue" as
a "noisy, bombastic, ranting speech." This tended to discredit
counsel's argument by giving it a contemptuous characterization.
The court went on to say that the use of any language which
tends to discredit any party to a dispute in court is an error of
law for which any verdict would be properly set aside.'
A Missouri trial judge had made remarks in front of the
jury which showed he doubted the word of defense attorneys.
Also his general remarks and the questions he asked the wit-
nesses indicated he had made up his mind that the plaintiffs
should recover. The upper court reversed on the ground it was
error for a trial judge to adopt a belligerent attitude toward
either party or show bias.' T
Michigan had a trial judge showing his antagonism toward
defense counsel by stating, "You may be able to fool some, but
you can't fool me on this . .. You better go ahead and behave
yourself . . . Let me tell you something! You are close to the
danger line." The judge added to the indignity by continually
addressing the attorney by his last name only. This was re-
versible error as holding counsel up to ridicule.18
Oklahoma has an unusual ruling on abuse where the appel-
late court may in a criminal case reduce the sentence, but will
not order a new trial. The assessment of moderate punishment
by the jury was held to show that the jury had not been af-
fected by the judge's brusque interruptions and harsh directions
to the defendant's lawyer.' 9 Nothing was said in the opinion
about the possibility of the jury finding him not guilty if there
had been a fair and impartial judge on the bench.
Another Oklahoma case had the judge, without apparent
justification, insinuate in the hearing of the jury that the defend-
ant's attorney was guilty of improper practice. The appeals court
felt no doubt concerning the defendant's guilt. Since no verdict
other than guilty could have resulted, the only prejudice was in
the imposition of the penalty by the jury. So giving the defend-
ant the benefit of the doubt, the error was corrected by reducing
his sentence. 20
16 Commonwealth v. Brown, 39 Pa. 515, 164 A. 726 (1933).
17 Fleetwood v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., Mo. 220 S. W. 2d 614 (1949).
I8 Parkside Housing Project v. Vandenbroker, 290 Mich. 582, 287 N. W. 571
(1939).
19 Stacey v. State, 79 Okla. Crim. 417, 155 P. 2d 736 (1945).
20 McMahon v. State, 96 Okla. Crim. 76, 251 P. 2d 204 (1952).
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Yet every instance of judicial abuse of attorneys is not al-
ways automatically corrected on appeal. A statement by the trial
court that counsel was attempting to indicate that the court had
ruled arbitrarily out of thin air and that any more reference to
any ruling would be considered close to contempt of court, was
ill-advised but not prejudicial to warrant a new trial.21
In another case the attorney contended that in his listing
of certain events during the trial the trial judge demonstrated a
persistent hostility toward the attorney and his client. The ap-
peals court noted that while on occasion the trial judge was
irascible and made several comments that could well have been
left unsaid, the record did not show "persistent" hostility. Hence
not reversible error.22
A Texas judge's repeated comment "Let's get along" was not
prejudicial error as he was only expediting the trial. Neither
was it error to lecture counsel and tell him that further violation
of its rulings would result in dismissal of the action.
23
Interestingly, there have been examples of misconduct by
judges toward prosecuting attorneys as well. Some years ago a
county attorney in Kentucky was a candidate against the incum-
bent for nomination for county judge. The judge, however, was
engaged with three police officers in stopping travelers on the
highway and charging them with alleged violations of traffic
laws. The alleged violators would appear before the judge, be
fined and then a portion of the fines "kicked back" to the arrest-
ing officers. The county attorney prosecuted the officers, and
they were held over to the grand jury. In retaliation the officers
induced a woman who was living with one of them to swear
in the presence of the judge that she had been detained against
her will by the county attorney. Although the judge knew she
was falsely swearing, he issued a warrant for the county at-
torney's arrest. Since the charges were subsequently found to be
false, proceedings were instituted against the judge for mal-
feasance. Section 277 of the Constitution of Kentucky provides
that a judge of a county court shall be subject to indictment for
malfeasance in office. The judge was found guilty under the
above, fined $100.00 and removed from office.2 4
21 Borchelt v. Wentz, 123 N. W. 2d 831 (S. Dak. 1963).
22 Wilson v. Kopp, 250 P. 2d 166 (Cal. 1962).
23 Runyon v. City of Brownsville, 371 S. W. 2d 924 (Tex. 1963).




In a Pennsylvania case, the district attorney and his assistant
were busy in another court room when a judge sent a message
to the district attorney that his presence was required. The dis-
trict attorney replied he would come as soon as possible, but he
was busy at the moment. When he finally did appear the trial
judge greeted him with some caustic remarks. This led to a
heated exchange with the district attorney being called into
chambers and offered in the alternative-either appear in open
court for a public rebuke or be cited for contempt. The district
attorney refused to choose whereupon he was cited for contempt.
The Pennsylvania court upheld this conviction.25 An interesting
sidelight to this case is that one of the appeals judges who had
been rebuked in a prior case for unjudicial behavior as a trial
judge 26 wrote a strong dissent. He pointed out that the record
was devoid of any record showing the district attorney being
rude or insolent to the court. The district attorney was con-
victed solely on the unsupported word of the judge. He cited his
own case asking why the trial court there (i.e., himself) had been
overruled and here the trial judge was supported?
In Pennsylvania it is even possible to have a case remanded
for the judge's failure to prevent abuse by the Attorney General.
In a trial for revocation of a non-profit corporate charter, the
judge permitted the Deputy Attorney General to indulge in vio-
lent diatribes against the defendants and their attorneys, ac-
cusing them of subversive activities. The trial court reversed on
other grounds but rebuked the trial judge for permitting the
abuse.27
If an attorney feels the judge has shown bias or prejudice
against him during the trial he must object then or move for a
mistrial.28 The majority of appellate courts hold that when a
party does not object during the course of a trial such party
cannot thereafter complain.29 However, any misconduct by a
25 Appeal of Levine, 372 Pa. 612, 95 A. 2d 222 (1953).
26 Supra, n. 4.
27 Commonwealth v. Yiddisher Kultur Farband, 382 Pa. 553, 116 A. 2d 555
(1955).
28 Freedman v. Housing Authority of City of Atlanta, 136 S. E. 2d 544 (Ga.
1963).
29 Starks v. Starks, 220 Minn. 313, 11 N. W. 2d 741 (1943); Giraney v. Ore-
gon Short Line R. R., 54 Idaho 535, 33 P. 2d 359 (1934); Payne v. Clark, 117
Neb. 238, 220 N. W. 262 (1938); Zaikaner v. Small, 256 Minn. 275, 98 N. W.
2d 247 (1959).
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trial judge from which an influencing of the jury and denial of
the rights of the parties might be inferred usually constitutes
prejudicial error.30
Yet many times when it would appear that the judge over-
stepped the bounds of judicial propriety the appeals court will
state that no substantial harm was shown. If the abuse falls on
attorneys for both sides or even if a little more heavily on one
side than the other this does not constitute reversible error.
3 1
Another case had slighting remarks apparently addressed to
counsel on both sides. The judge stated to the jury on opening
day of court that there were "tricks to all trades and the legal
profession is the trade of all tricks," that there were "smart
young lawyers" entering the elevators with jurors. They would
be talking about the case for the jurors' benefit in order to in-
fluence them. The trial court, although deprecating the trial
judge's remarks, did not feel the judge to be more prejudiced
toward one side than the other. Also there had been no motion
to strike out the remarks during the trial. So on the basis that
counsel for both sides were equally denigrated and no exception
raised during the trial, there was no reversible error.3 2
An appeals court has also failed to reverse when the judge
was not substantially derogatory or belittling since he treated the
law fully in his charge to the jury.33 And a motion termed "silly"
by the trial judge was held on appeal to be an overly harsh
characterization but the conviction was not reversed since the
judge had told the jury to disregard his statements.3 4
Weapon on Contempt of Court
The weapon of contempt in the hands of an unprincipled
judge is deadly. It is generally recognized that an attorney may
be disbarred, suspended, or otherwise disciplined for misconduct.
This is peculiarly a power belonging to the Common Law tradi-
tion and not found in the countries under the Civil Law. For
instance, courts in France lack the power of their Anglo-Ameri-
30 People v. Frank, 71 Cal. App. 575, 236 P. 189 (1925); Abbott v. Coronado
Beach Co., 55 Cal. App. 179, 203 P. 145 (1921).
31 Germ v. City and County of San Francisco, 99 Cal. App. 404, 222 P. 2d
122 (1950).
32 Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County v. Mike, 3 Ill. 2d 49, 119 N. E. 2d
734 (1954).
33 Simcoe v. Pope, 123 N. W. 2d 311 (Minn. 1963).




can counterparts because the sanction of contempt of court is
non-existent. 35 The power of American courts to punish for al-
leged contempt of their authority, although undoubted, is in its
nature arbitrary, and appeals courts are often reluctant to up-
hold it except under the circumstances and manner precribed by
law.30 Still this does not prevent some judges from acting arbi-
trarily and even capriciously in finding counsel in contempt.
It is a well known fact, even if difficult to document, that the
fearsome reputation of some judges causes many attorneys to do
what is euphemistically called "judge shopping," i.e., seeking a
postponement in hopes that when the case is again called for
trial a judge of a more bland temperament will hear it.
There are numerous cases of the arbitrary use of the con-
tempt power ranging from the state to the federal courts.
Contempt in the State Courts
A California judge thought the defense attorney was taking
too much time questioning a witness, interrupted and ordered
counsel to speed things up. When counsel objected rather
strenuously, stating that he thought the interests of his client
demanded a painstaking questioning, the court found him in
contempt. The appeals court ruled that an attorney has the
right to protect the interests of a client and if in discharging
his duty he happens to be persistent or vehement he is well
within his legitimate rights. The court also noted that quarrel-
ing and bickering with opposing counsel does not constitute
contempt. 37
Occasionally sympathy for maligned counsel creeps through
the pontifical intonations of the appeals court opinion. A defense
attorney in a garnishee case with a finance company stated in
open court that the judge, "perhaps unwittingly" because of a
prior connection as attorney for a finance company, tended to
discount all defense raised by borrowers from finance companies.
Counsel also pointed out that it was the general feeling that it
was hopeless to try such cases in front of this judge and asked
that he disqualify himself. The judge took umbrage at these
remarks, feeling they tended to impair the court's dignity and
85 David & deVries, The French Legal System, 102 (1958).
36 Bennett v. Superior Court in and for San Diego County, 99 Cal. App.
585, 222 P. 2d 276 (1950).
37 Ibid.
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authority, found the attorney to be in contempt, and ordered him
to pay a fine of $250.00 or be imprisoned. On appeal the convic-
tion was reversed on the ground that a statement which might
impair respect for a trial judge cannot be contemptuous if made
in good faith to protect the interests of a client and in the
honest belief that is relevant and without reckless disregard for
the truth. The court noted in closing that the attorney should
have been given the opportunity to present evidence which
might indicate justification for the statement.38 If the last is to
be taken literally, in New York an attorney may make a state-
ment about a judge if it can be proved.
A New Jersey case points out to what extremes some judges
will pursue their resentment at a petty annoyance. The plaintiff's
counsel interrupted the judge to answer a rhetorical question.
Found in contempt, he was ordered to pay a fine to the sheriff.
That official informed counsel he would have to be photographed
and fingerprinted like any other criminal. The attorney refused
to subject himself to this humiliation, and the judge had him
pay the fine to the clerk. The appeals court failed to find that the
record showed any conduct on the part of the attorney which
was in the slightest disrespectful to the court. The finding of
contempt was reversed.39
The attorney in a Pennsylvania case sought to have his
client's trial moved to the United States District Court. In the
hearing to show cause he stated the county judges were so
prejudiced his client could not possibly get a fair trial. The Court
of Common Pleas ordered his name stricken from the role of
attorneys for six months. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
felt he had used bad taste, but what he said was in the course
of a judicial proceeding and was relevant and pertinent to the
cause of the inquiry. "The appellant (attorney) was within his
privilege in making a disrespectful criticism of the learned and
upright court below." 40
Mere expression by an attorney on motion for a new trial
that a prior order of the court "defeated the ends of justice" did
not constitute contempt in the absence of any showing that the
opinion was not advanced in good faith. The appeals court
8 In Re Rotwein, 293 N. Y. 116, 51 N. E. 2d 669 (1943).
89 Marino v. Cocuzzo, 14 N. J. Super. 16, 81 A. 2d 181 (1951).




opinion was that an attorney is not guilty of contempt in point-
ing out "inadequacies in the court's actions." 41
There is a strong suspicion that use of contempt as a weapon
to badger attorneys occurs far more often as a threat than might
appear in the court records. There is no way of determining
how many attorneys pay their fines or else abjectly apologize
for some fancied grievance on the part of the judge. To expunge
the record of such a finding means, of course, an appeal some-
times to the highest tribunal with its concurrent expenses and
time-consuming efforts. Attorneys are probably just like any
other litigant, reluctant to invest the time, money and energy into
an appeal. And the reviewing courts will support a contempt
citation only under the most glaring and flagrant abuses of the
courtroom's dignity and decorum.
Contempt in the Federal Courts
Nothing said so far should indicate that appeals courts turn
a blind eye to all contemptuous behavior by attorneys. The
courts will and have sustained such convictions when the viola-
tion was flagrantly obvious from the record. The United States
Supreme Court sustained the contempt conviction of defense
counsel for conduct at the trial which culminated in the affirm-
ance of Dennis v. United States, 42 where a Communist Party of-
ficial was convicted of contempt of Congress. Defense counsel
argued that since the trial judge had waited for the completion
of the nine months trial his power to punish for contempt had
expired. The Supreme Court rejected this by noting that the
trial judge had waited until after the trial was over in order to
give counsel's clients as fair a trial as possible and to deny the
court the power to punish at the end of the trial was to deny
the power altogether.43
The landmark case supporting the power of the federal
courts to punish an attorney for contempt dates back to the late
1800's. During the trial the attorney's wife apparently rose
from her seat in the courtroom to address the court. The judge
ordered her to be quiet and remain seated. When this failed to
stop her, the United States marshal was ordered to remove her
from the courtroom. When the marshal started to eject her the
41 Ridan v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 34 Cal. 2d 83, 206 P. 2d
1081 (1949).
42 339 U. S. 162, 70 S. Ct. 519, 94 L. Ed. 734 (1950).
43 Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1, 72 S. Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 717 (1952).
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attorney-husband drew a knife and assaulted the marshal. After
a scuffle the attorney was disarmed, and he left the courtroom.
The court in the meantime found the attorney to be in contempt
for obstructing the administration of justice. He was not ar-
rested until late in the day. The attorney's argument was that
the court's power to hold him in contempt was a nullity as soon
as he left the confines of the courtroom. The United States
Supreme Court rejected this argument by stating that the power
of the court to punish for contempt was virtually unlimited. An
order of commitment may be made without notice to the offender
and without giving him an opportunity to be heard.44 The case
resulted in a change in the statute to affirm the right of the
federal courts to punish contempt.45 It gives the court the statu-
tory power to arrest and imprison the offender at the discretion
of the court without further proof or examination.
The United States Supreme Court for many years was re-
luctant to overrule the contempt citations of a trial court. An
attorney trying a workman's compensation case had the Texas
trial judge rule that a certain line of argument was inadmissible
under the special issues. The attorney in attempting to explain
to the court why he thought the ruling was erroneous was found
to be in contempt. The conviction was upheld by the Texas
Supreme Court and then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court which upheld the trial judge by a 5 to 4 decision.
The transcript couldn't convey the expression, manner of
speaking, bearing and attitude of petitioner. Also mildly
provocative language from the bench does not put constitu-
tional protection around an attorney.
The obvious inference to be gained is that the attorney is
expected to be more restrained than the judge. Justice Douglas
in a stinging dissent pointed out that the judge did not purport
to fine and imprison the petitioner for the manner of making
the objection, for the tone of his voice or his facial expression.
The dispute was merely over the bounds of permissible comment
before a jury, and the attorney was acting the role of the re-
sourceful lawyer. Justice Douglas thought the transcript clearly
indicated the judge picked a quarrel with the attorney and used
his high position to wreak vengeance on him.
46
44 Ex Parte Terry, 128 U. S. 289, 9 S. Ct. 77, 30 L. Ed. 405 (1888).
45 Fed. Rules Crim. Proc., Rule 42(a), 18 U. S. C. A. Const. Amends. 1-10.




The United States Supreme Court in another case excused
the trial judge's unjustified treatment of the defendant's attorney
on the ground that the lapse was "human." 47 The tendency to
excuse the judge's lapses as only "human" tends to ignore the
fact that they are supposed to be "humane" as well.
In cases involving injudicious and abusive comments by the
trial judge the federal appeals courts lately have been more
critical. This may be due to the fact that the United States
Supreme Court has shown itself to be increasingly concerned
with individual rights and the circuit court level has adopted the
view as well.
A few years ago, a district judge displayed an attitude of
impatience and annoyance at proper objections as if they were
captious, absurd and unnecessary and made occasional remarks
disparaging defense counsel. The circuit court ordered a new
trial as the defense's case was seriously prejudiced in the eyes
of the jury.4s Another case was also reversed about the same
time by another circuit court of appeals when the judge charged
the defense counsel with "pettifoggery." 49
A recent United States Supreme Court case involved an
attorney faced with an erroneous ruling from the district judge
which cut off the basic issue of the trial. Wishing to provide a
record which would allow the ruling to be reviewed, counsel
proceeded to produce evidence and call witnesses on this issue.
The judge stopped him. This put the attorney in a dilemma for
he had no way of knowing if the appeals court would treat the
trial court's ruling as appealable. Counsel insisted upon the
right to continue, stating, "We propose to do so unless some bailiff
stops us." The judge then allowed the trial to continue, but after-
wards he charged the attorney with contempt. The Supreme
Court in its opinion reversing the contempt finding noted it was
interested in the "exercise of self-restraint of the summary
power of contempt by the district judges." The court felt that
lawyers should be able to make honest, good-faith efforts to
present their case.5
47 United States v. Leviton, 93 F. 2d 848, 343 U. S. 946, 72 S. Ct. 860, 96 L.
Ed. 1350, reh. den. 343 U. S. 988, 72 S. Ct. 1079, 96 L. Ed. 1375.
48 United States v. Ah Kee Eng, 241 F. 2d 157 (2d Cir. 1957).
49 Kraft v. United States, 238 F. 2d 794 (8th Cir. 1956).
5o In Re McConnell, 370 U. S. 230, 82 S. Ct. 1288, 8 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1962).
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Curbing Judicial Abuse
The preceding cases show that contempt citations can be
appealed and abuse of counsel can be reversible error. But what
action lies against a judge who slanders or libels counsel during
the course of a trial, or unjustly finds him guilty of contempt?
The answer is-not very much. In most states a judge has an
absolute privilege as to anything he might say or do during a
trial.51 The reason for the rule rests on public policy; it being
of supreme importance that judicial officers be encouraged to
speak their honest convictions freely and without fear of the
consequences.
What if anything can be done to curb judicial abuse? The
problem of selection of men to sit on the bench and the old
argument of election versus selection does not properly lie within
the scope of this article. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the qual-
ity of man elevated to the bench has a great deal to do with the
quality of justice. But once on the bench a judge is extremely
difficult to dislodge.
The problem of good behavior as far as the federal judiciary
is concerned has some attention from the popular press. One
writer suggests that every justice could come before Congress
periodically for "reconfirmation." 52 However, every time a judge
made an unpopular decision he might have a substantial portion
of Congress looking for a scapegoat. The result might hamstring
an independent judiciary.
At the state level where the constitution of a state sets forth
the ground for discipline of a judge and the procedure to be
followed, the legislature has no power to provide other bases for
discipline. The Constitution of Ohio, for example, provides as
follows:
Judges may be removed from office by concurrent resolutions
of both houses of the General Assembly if two-thirds of the
members elected to each house concur.
53
The problem might be eased if a distinction could be made
between supervision and discipline. Some states provide for the
general supervision of the work of judges by either a judiciary
committee or by the state's highest tribunal. The Administrative
51 42 A. L. R. 2d 825 (Anno.), 33 Am. Jur., "Libel & Slander," sec. 170.
52 Good Behavior of Judges, Who Defines It?, U. S. News & World Report,
p. 104, July 5, 1957.




Office of the United States Courts does a certain amount of
supervision; for instance, although it cannot discipline a judge,
it can make certain recommendations such as to the type of case
heard or the case load of individual judges. New Jersey in-
stituted certain judicial reforms some years ago among which
was the supervision and power to discipline given the state
Supreme Court.54
Yet turning over the discipline of judges to other judges is
somewhat akin to setting the cat to watch the cream. This was
admitted very frankly by a judge in an opinion discussing the
problem.
Judges naturally give high value to the claims and qualities
of their group. It is indeed a difficult matter for a member
of one group to resolve with complete fairness the conflict
between their own group and other groups. But there are
no special tribunals for such conflicts and courts must resolve
them as best they can. 55
The American Bar Association adopted a series of canons of
judicial ethics some years ago. Canons 4 and 5 deal with the
judge's official conduct and set forth the standards of propriety.5 6
But progress in their adoption in the various states has been
unsatisfactory. Among the twenty-five states having integrated
bar associations, fifteen have no judicial code of ethics nor do
thirteen where the bar is organized on a voluntary basis.57
Curbing judicial abuse is perhaps even more important to the
bench and the bar than it is to the public at large. If the legal
profession fails to take effective steps, we may be sure that the
public will; and the result could well be a weakened judiciary
and a captive profession.
54 Miller, Discipline of Judges, 50 Mich. L. R. 737-40 (1952).
55 Merrick v. Security & Trust Co., 107 F. 2d 271 (App. D. C. 1939).
56 Canons of Judicial Ethics-American Bar Association (1924).
Canon 4-"Avoidance of Impropriety"--A judge's official conduct should
be free from impropriety; he should avoid infractions of the law; his per-
sonal behavior not only upon the Bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his every day life, should be beyond reproach.
Canon 5--"Essential Conduct"--A judge should be temperate, attentive,
patient, impartial and since he is to administer the law and apply it to the
facts, he should be studious of the principles of the law and diligent in en-
deavoring to ascertain the facts.
57 Blaustein & Porter, The American Lawyer (1960).
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